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ABSTRACT
This study examines whether sharing the potential tax savings and risk of
penalties associated with tax evasion with another individual and the anticipation of
potential regret from an adverse IRS audit affect an individual decision maker’s
propensity to evade taxes. Research on risky decision making suggests that individuals
will be less likely to evade taxes when the benefits and costs of evasion are shared, while
research on ethical decision making suggests that individuals will be more likely to evade
taxes when the benefits of evasion are shared with another individual. Using
experimental data obtained from 147 experienced taxpayers throughout the United States,
this study finds evidence consistent with the risky decision making literature.
Specifically, this study demonstrates that taxpayers are less likely to evade taxes when
they share the potential tax savings and risk of penalties with another taxpayer compared
to when the tax evasion decision affects solely the decision maker. In addition, this study
demonstrates that regret salience decreases a taxpayer’s willingness to evade taxes.
Specifically, asking taxpayers to anticipate the regret they would experience if they were
caught evading taxes before making a reporting decision lowers their likelihood of
evasion.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Income tax reporting is a voluntary compliance system in which taxpayers report to the
government how much taxable income they have for the year and remit taxes based on
this figure. The most recent estimates provided by the IRS show that almost 20%
(approximately $450 billion) of the United States tax revenue in 2006 was lost due to
taxpayer noncompliance (IRS 2012b). A common form of noncompliance is the
misrepresentation of taxable income to generate tax savings. This opportunity to
misrepresent taxable income exists because a substantial amount of information is subject
to little or no third party verification (e.g. rents and royalties, farm income, deductions,
Partnership/S-Corp income). When the opportunity to misreport taxable income exists, it
is important to understand the factors influencing taxpayers reporting decisions.1 The
purpose of this study is to examine how tax evasion is affected by two important factors:
1) a shared interest in the consequences of tax compliance and 2) the salience of the
anticipated regret that a taxpayer may experience from an adverse audit.
A shared interest in the consequences of tax compliance is very common. For
example, in 2008 there were over 3.1 million Partnerships and over 2.5 million SCorporations filing tax returns with the IRS (IRS 2012a). For “pass through” entities, tax
compliance decisions made at the entity level have a direct effect on the taxation of each
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For reviews of the taxpayer compliance literature see Jackson and Milliron (1986), Cuccia (1994), and
Kornhauser (2008).
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of the entity’s owners, since the entity’s income is allocated to and reported on the
owners’ personal tax returns. This business form creates a shared interest in the
consequences of the tax evasion decision among the owners. Despite the prevalence of
shared interest arrangements, prior research has not addressed whether a shared interest
affects the decision process of the individual who is making tax compliance decisions on
behalf of themself and one or more other individuals.
The risky decision literature and ethics literature develop competing predictions
regarding how a shared interest in the consequences of tax evasion impacts taxpayer
compliance. On one hand, Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) model of tax evasion implies
that the decision to evade taxes is a rational decision dependent upon risk. That is, tax
evasion is a gamble between potential tax savings and potential penalties. When there is a
shared interest in the consequences of tax evasion, the decision maker is making a risky
decision that affects oneself and other(s) concurrently. Prior research involving risk in
domains outside of taxation has focused on how making a decision on the behalf of
another individual differs from decisions made on one’s own behalf. For example,
McCauley et al. (1971) and Zaleska and Kogan (1971) show that decisions tend to be less
risky when made on behalf of another individual. Within a tax setting, this research
suggests that if a tax evasion decision is viewed as a decision made under risk, the
presence of another individual who is affected by the tax reporting decision (i.e. a shared
interest) will lead decision makers to a lower willingness to evade.
On the other hand, tax evasion decisions may not be based on risk. Tax evasion
choices also involve moral and ethical considerations (Alm and Torgler 2011). Ethics
research in domains outside of taxation has shown that, individuals are more willing to
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perform an unethical act when the benefits of performing that act are shared between the
decision maker and one or more individuals, as compared to when the decision maker
reaps all the benefits (Wiltermuth 2011; Church et al. 2012). This willingness comes, in
part, because the decision maker views the act as less unethical when it benefits another
individual. Applying these findings to a tax setting suggests that, if taxpayers view tax
evasion primarily as an ethical decision, then sharing the tax savings with other
individuals will allow the taxpayer to justify evasion as less unethical. These beliefs, in
turn, will lead to an increase in the willingness to evade taxes.
Regardless of whether tax evasion is viewed primarily as a risky decision or an
ethical decision, if a taxpayer evades and later is caught (i.e. undergoes an adverse audit),
he/she will likely regret the decision to evade due to the penalties and shame associated
with tax evasion. Regret theory suggests that if taxpayers anticipate the potential regret
they would experience from an adverse audit, they may apply greater weight to the risks
of tax evasion (Bell 1982; Loomes and Sugden 1982). However, for potential regret to
affect individual decision making, this post-decisional regret must be salient at the time
the decision is made. In a shared interest setting, there is potential to experience two
types of regret which may be coupled: individual regret and other-induced regret (Stone
et al. 2002). This study proposes that when potential regret is made salient to the
taxpayer, tax evasion will decrease.
To examine how a shared interest in the consequences of tax evasion and regret
salience jointly affect taxpayer behavior, this study utilizes a 2×2 full factorial
experimental design. Participants are asked to review a case scenario and indicate how
likely they would be to evade taxes by reporting cash revenues below the amount known
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to have been received for the year. The first manipulated variable is whether there is a
shared interest in the consequences of tax evasion and is operationalized by varying the
business ownership form in the case materials at two levels. Holding constant the level of
individual wealth, half of the participants are told to assume they operate their business as
a Sole Proprietorship and that their decisions only affect solely themselves, while the
second half of the participants are told to assume they operate their business with a
partner and that their decisions affect themselves and their partners equally.
The second independent variable is the participant’s decision frame which is also
manipulated at two levels, a control frame and a regret frame. In the regret frame
condition, prior to deciding how willing they are to underreport cash revenues,
participants are asked to indicate the level of regret they would experience if they were
audited and caught evading taxes. In the control frame condition, participants are not
asked to indicate the level of regret they would experience if they were audited and
caught evading taxes until after they decide how willing they are to underreport cash
revenues. The control frame condition more closely resembles taxpayers natural decision
processes without experimenter manipulation and thus provides a baseline from which to
compare the responses to the regret frame condition.
Results from this study indicate that participants in the Partnership conditions
have significantly lower tax evasion intentions than participants in the Sole Proprietor
conditions. Such results are consistent with participants making evasion decisions based
on risk. In addition, consistent with regret theory, participants in the regret frame
condition have significantly lower tax evasion intentions than participants in the control
frame condition.

4

This paper makes at least two significant contributions to the tax compliance
literature. First, it shows that sharing the risks and rewards of tax evasion influences a
taxpayer’s propensity to evade taxes. Because taxpayers’ evasion decisions are affected
by the presence of a shared interest in the consequences of tax compliance, regulators
may shift their audit practices to account for such differences. Specifically, this study
suggests that regulators may consider shifting resources away from tax returns where the
consequences of tax evasion are shared, such as Partnerships returns, and toward tax
returns filed with Sole Proprietor income.
Second, this study indicates that taxpayers are less likely to evade when they
anticipate the regret they would experience if they were caught evading taxes.
Researchers and regulators could use the results of this study to examine specific
strategies to make regret more salient to taxpayers before making tax compliance
decisions. For example, Alm and Torgler (2011) suggest that publicizing tax evasion
convictions in the media may increase tax compliance, as this publicly increases the
salience of the negative consequences of evasion.
Chapter II provides a brief background of the tax compliance literature. Chapter
III develops the specific hypotheses. Chapter IV discusses the experimental methods.
Chapter V presents the study results, and Chapter VI concludes.
.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND – TAX COMPLIANCE
Early research on tax compliance centered its predictions on economic utility theory and
Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) model of tax evasion, which incorporates economic
factors (income level and tax rate) and deterrent factors (penalty rate and detection rate)
into a tax evasion decision. Their model suggests that an individual will choose to report
an income level that maximizes the expected utility payoff in an evasion gamble, which
is a function of the individual’s true income, the tax rate, the audit probability, and the
penalty imposed for underreporting income. Therefore, early tax research focused on risk
when studying decision making involving tax evasion. However, this early model has
received mixed support (e.g. Becker et al. 1987; Beck et al. 1991; Alm et al. 1992). In
fact, individuals engage in lower levels of tax evasion (report higher levels of taxable
income) than would be predicted by models based on economic utility theory (White et
al. 1993; Dhami and al-Nowaihi 2007). These mixed results have led researchers to
examine noneconomic factors that may influence taxpayer behavior.
One such noneconomic factor involves ethical decision making. Alm and Torgler
(2011) shows that an individual’s moral beliefs towards tax evasion has an effect on tax
compliance behavior, in that an individual will comply as long as he/she believes it is the
“right thing to do.” Survey evidence supports the assertion that a taxpayer’s ethics play a
vital role in an individual’s compliance decisions (Song and Yarbrough 1978). Erard and
Feinstein (1994) hypothesized that the guilt associated with making an unethical decision
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will cause a taxpayer to lose utility from tax evasion. More recently, Alm and Torgler
(2011) proposed a formal theory of compliance which incorporates a loss in utility from
the emotional cost associated with performing an unethical behavior or from acting in
opposition to a social ethical norm.
In summary, prior literature suggests the tax evasion decision is both a decision
under risk and also an ethical decision. In the next section, previous research on decision
making under risk and ethical decision making will be utilized to develop specific
predictions for the current study.

7

CHAPTER 3
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
3.1 SHARED INTEREST IN THE CONSEQUENCES OF TAX EVASION
A shared interest in the consequences of tax compliance can occur when a tax evasion
decision has a direct effect on both the decision maker and one or more other taxpayers.
To develop a hypothesis concerning how a shared interest in the consequences of tax
evasion may affect taxpayer decision making, this study examines the prior literature in
both the risk and ethics domains. Since early tax research (Allingham and Sandmo 1972)
suggested that a tax evasion decision is a risk gamble, the discussion will begin by
examining the risk literature.
Although the risk literature has not explicitly examined how a shared interest in
the consequences of a risky decision affects individual decision making, there has been
literature pertaining to how decision making is affected by whether the consequences of
that decision affect solely oneself or solely another individual. In Zaleska and Kogan
(1971), participants were required to make six risk gamble choices, each offering 10
possible bet alternatives. Using a within subjects experimental design, participants first
made these choices for themselves and the second time for another individual. The results
of that study provide clear evidence of a risk adverse shift when making decisions for
others relative to the prior decisions made for oneself. McCauley et al. (1971) tested the
robustness of these findings by performing a similar task and demonstrates that
individuals make more conservative financial gamble decisions for others then they do
8

for themselves. Borrensen (1987) demonstrates in a buy versus lease decision that
participants were more economically conservative when making decisions for other
individuals than for themselves.
Stone et al. (2002) discusses how the differences in risky decision making for
oneself versus for another individual may be because when making decisions for another
individual, the decision maker may have a goal of self-image protection. When making a
decision for another individual, guilt is a factor that affects the maintenance of selfimage. For example, in a tax compliance setting, if a managing partner decides to
underreport income for the partnership and the partnership is subsequently audited, the
decision maker will experience guilt for initially placing the other partners at risk. In the
medical field, Casarett and Ross (1997) suggest that doctors sometimes make
conservative decisions despite the expressed wishes of their patients in order to dissuade
feelings of guilt. This is supported by Kray (2000), which indicated that advisors make
recommendations that minimize regret and blame from others.
Although the prior literature discussed above does not examine exactly how
sharing the consequences of a decision with another individual may affect risky decision
making, it does suggest that the presence of another individual will decrease risk taking
behavior in a monetary gamble setting. Therefore, it is expected that if the risk involved
in a tax evasion gamble is the major driver of taxpayer reporting decisions, then sharing
the consequences from the tax reporting decision will reduce the taxpayers’ willingness
to evade taxes. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a: Taxpayers’ willingness to evade will be lower when the
consequences of evasion are shared with another individual than when the
consequences of evasion are not shared. (Based on risk literature)
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Taxpayers may also make reporting decisions based upon their moral and ethical
beliefs (Alm and Torgler 2011). Blanthorne and Kaplan (2008) suggest that taxpayers
may alter their ethical beliefs when they benefit from a decision, irrespective of whether
this benefit is monetary or emotional. Individuals redefine or reinterpret their behavior in
order to self-justify unethical behavior and make it morally permissible to oneself
(Bandura 1990, 1999, 2002). This is consistent with moral disengagement which occurs
when an individual believes that ethical standards do not apply to oneself in a particular
context (Fiske 2010).
Previous research has shown that individuals are more willing to perform an
unethical act when it benefits a third party. Gino and Pierce (2009, 2010) demonstrate
that if a decision maker feels empathy towards a third-party, he/she is more likely to act
unethically to benefit that individual. In their studies, participants were more likely to
overstate the performance of a third-party in a task when there was perceived wealth
inequity. Specifically, the emotional benefit obtained from restoring wealth equity
allowed the decision maker to justify performing the unethical behavior.
Wiltermuth (2011) also finds that people are more likely to act unethically if it
benefits a third party. Specifically, Wiltermuth (2011) tests whether an individual is more
likely to cheat when the benefits of cheating are split with a third party versus when they
are kept solely by the individual. Expanding on the work of Gino and Pierce (2009,
2010), Wiltermuth (2011) shows that the mere presence of a third party beneficiary, even
an unknown third party, can increase the prevalence of unethical behavior. Wiltermuth
(2011) concluded that individuals who were able to split the rewards of cheating with a
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third-party were able to justify to themselves that helping another individual made the act
of cheating less immoral.
In the accounting literature, Church et al. (2012) demonstrates a similar behavior
in a managerial budget task. Church et al. (2012) investigates the level of budgetary slack
created by a manager when the slack was kept solely by the manager compared to when it
was shared by the manager and other non-reporting employees. They found that the
shared interest in slack creation made misreporting self-justifiable to the manager
because it benefited the non-reporting employees.
The literature above establishes that the presence of a third party beneficiary can
help an individual rationalize an act as being more ethically permissible which leads to an
increase in the unethical behavior. Therefore, if taxpayers’ ethical beliefs are a major
driver of taxpayer reporting decisions, then sharing the consequences from the tax
reporting decision should increase the taxpayers’ willingness to evade taxes. This leads to
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1b: Taxpayers’ willingness to evade will be greater when the
consequences of evasion are shared with another individual than when the
consequences of evasion are not shared. (Based on ethics literature)

3.2 REGRET SALIENCE
Decision makers may experience regret (rejoicing) if the actual outcome of a decision is
worse (better) than a forgone alternative (Zeelenberg 1999). Regret theory extends
expected utility theory by suggesting that decision makers will incorporate the emotional
cost of anticipated regret into their decision making, when comparing the outcome of a
chosen alternative to the outcome of a rejected alternative (Bell 1982; Loomes and
Sugden 1982). Regret theory assumes that decision makers are regret avoiders and will
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select an option that minimizes the potential regret (Bell 1982; Loomes and Sugden
1982). Zeelenberg (1999) suggests that in a choice between a gamble (e.g. evasion) and a
sure thing (e.g. being compliant), the regret minimizing choice is normally the risk-averse
option.2
Regret theory suggests that a taxpayer anticipating the regret they would
experience from the consequences of an adverse audit will be more likely to prefer the
regret-avoiding option, which is to comply. Regret avoidance may be one of the possible
explanations for prior literature’s findings that tax evasion is lower than levels predicted
by expected utility theory (White et al. 1993; Dhami and al-Nowaihi 2007).3
Studies examining anticipated regret have either focused on the role of expected
feedback or the salience of regret on decision making (Zeelenberg 1999).4 The current
study examines the latter. Regret salience is the cognizance of post-decisional regret that
decision makers anticipate prior to making a decision. Prior studies demonstrate that if
potential future regret is brought to the attention of the decision maker at the time the
decision is made, regret will receive a higher weight in the decision process.
When regret is salient, past research shows that decision makers’ choices are
more strongly aimed at avoiding regret. In a study by Simonson (1992), participants
2
Zeelenberg (1999) demonstrates that regret can also lead to risk-seeking behavior when there is a choice
between two options, one being more risky than the other (neither is a sure thing), and the decision maker
expects feedback on the riskier option.
3

Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) demonstrate that there is a 91-98% return on tax evasion using actual
probabilities of audit and penalty rates, but the evidence is that only 30% of taxpayers evade taxes. In the
current study’s results discussed later, 36.7% of participants chose to evade taxes. White et al. (1993) show
that taxpayers’ actions are consistent with expected utility theory only when detection rates and audit
probabilities are unrealistically high.
4

Manipulations of expected feedback test an important assumption in regret theory that if there is no
explicit feedback on the foregone alternative, a decision maker cannot compare the alternatives and cannot
experience regret. In a tax setting, Kelsey and Schepanski (1991) focused on manipulations of expected
feedback and found little support for regret theory. The current study examines if asking taxpayers to
anticipate the regret they would feel from an adverse audit reduces tax evasive behavior.
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made a purchasing decision between a safe option (high priced, well-known brand) and a
risky option (less expensive, unknown brand). Participants who were asked to indicate
their feelings of regret for making a wrong decision ex ante were more likely to purchase
the safe option compared to the participants not asked to indicate their feelings of regret.
Similarly, Richard et al. (1996) demonstrated that asking respondents to anticipate the
regret and emotions they would experience after engaging in unsafe sex reported less
risky sexual behavior in the five months following the study as compared to a control
group not asked to indicate their anticipated regret. In addition, Reb (2008) shows that in
a financial setting in which participants were asked to select between two investment
funds, asking participants to imagine “how much regret you would feel if you chose the
worse option” altered the decision making process.
In a tax setting, regret salience should encourage taxpayers to comply because the
potential for regret is greatest when the taxpayer evades taxes and is penalized for that
decision, thereby leaving the taxpayer with a lower payoff then if they had originally
been compliant. Therefore, asking taxpayers to anticipate the negative emotions they
would experience if they are caught evading taxes will lead to more compliant tax
behavior. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Taxpayers willingness to evade will be lower when regret
salience is cued than when regret salience is not cued.
When a taxpayer makes tax compliance decisions on behalf of themself and
others, Stone et al. (2002) would suggest that there is potential for two types of regret: (1)
individual regret, when making decisions where the outcomes affect the decision maker,
and (2) other-induced regret, when the outcomes of a decision affect another person.
Stone et al. (2002) examined the role of regret in individual decision making for
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monetary choices that affected either solely another individual or solely the decision
maker. That study asked participants to choose between a sure monetary outcome and a
gamble that involved a chance at a larger gain or nothing. Stone et al. (2002) concluded
that regret research on individual decision making could generalize to decision making
for others since regret affects individual decision making for oneself in a statistically
similar way to individual decision making for others. However, it does not indicate
whether other-induced regret and individual regret is additive.
It is possible that the presence of both other-induced regret and individual
regret affect decision making more than when only individual regret is present. It is
expected that asking taxpayers in a shared interest setting to anticipate the negative
emotions they would experience if they had been caught evading taxes will lead to a
greater level of anticipated regret than asking taxpayers not in a shared interest setting,
and consequently will lead to a greater decrease in tax evasion. This leads to the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Cueing regret salience will reduce evasion intentions more
when taxpayers share the consequences of evasion with another individual
than when the consequences from evasion are not shared.

14

CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS
4.1 PARTICIPANTS
This study recruited 147 experienced taxpayers from throughout the United States by
utilizing an online survey-taking population pool, Amazon Mechanical Turk (M-Turk).
The use of M-Turk participants is becoming increasingly popular in social science
experiments. They are a large subject pool, easily available, and arguable more
representative than more traditional student pools (Paolacci et al. 2010; Rennekamp
2012). Each participant was paid a dollar for their participation, and on average it took
participants nine minutes to complete the study. The participants were matched to the
objectives of the experiment following the guidance of Libby et al. (2002) which suggests
that the sophistication of participants should be in line with the goals of the experiment.
To participate in the current study, participants had to have filed six or more
years’ worth of United States federal income tax returns, and correctly answered two
qualifying questions demonstrating basic tax knowledge. These qualifications were to
provide comfort that the participant population had the experience and knowledge to
understand the case material. The average age of the participants was 36.85 years old and
47.3% of the participants were female. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the demographic
information collected from the participants at the end of the experimental instrument.
Participants for this study were dispersed across geographic regions of the United States,
average household incomes, and education levels. Approximately 84% of the participants
15

indicated that they were the primary decision maker on their income tax returns. The
demographics of the study participants did not statistically differ between experimental
conditions.

4.2 TASK
The experimental instrument for this study was administered online utilizing Qualtrics
Survey Software. The software randomly assigned participants into the treatment
conditions, discussed below. After reading a brief introduction which described to the
participants that their responses were completely anonymous, participants in this study
were told that they will be presented with a tax situation similar to one many taxpayers
face each year, and were asked to respond to questions as if they were the taxpayer
described in the case. The case material presented the participants with a rental property
scenario. Participants were informed that in addition to their regular full-time
employment, they also owned a number of rental properties. The participants were told
that they allow their tenants to pay rent in cash, with a check, or direct deposit. The rent
which was paid with a check or direct deposit is known for certain, but the participants
are informed of a range of cash revenues received for the year. That is, participants know
the minimum and maximum of cash revenue possibly received for the year, but there is
uncertainty about the actual amount of cash rental revenues received. The participants
were told that they will be making a tax reporting decision pertaining to the cash rental
revenue received for the year and to assume that rental income is taxed at a 35% rate.
Appendix A contains the experimental test instrument.
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4.3 DESIGN
To test how a shared interest in the consequences of tax evasion and regret salience affect
tax compliance behavior, this study utilized a 2×2 full factorial experimental design. The
first independent variable (SHARED INTEREST) manipulated the presence or absence
of a shared interest in the consequences of tax compliance by informing participants that
they owned and operated their rental property business by themselves as a Sole Proprietor
or that they owned rental properties with a partner in a Partnership. To hold constant the
individual wealth state for the decision maker between the Sole Proprietor and
Partnership conditions, the number of properties owned in the Partnership condition and
potential revenue was double that of the Sole Proprietor condition.
The second independent variable (DECISION FRAME) was also manipulated at
two levels (see Figure 4.1). In the first decision frame condition (regret frame),
participants were asked to indicate “how much regret you would feel if (1) you alone
decided for the Sole Proprietorship (Partnership) to underreport income, (2) the Sole
Proprietorship (Partnership) was audited by the IRS, and (3) as a result of the audit, you
(and your partner) had to pay additional taxes, penalties and interest.” This question was
asked prior to the dependent variable of interest, and therefore was meant to heighten the
taxpayer’s awareness of the potential regret they could possibly experience from
aggressive tax reporting. The second decision frame condition (control frame), captures
the dependent variable of interest prior to asking the participants to indicate potential
feelings of regret from aggressive reporting. Therefore, in both decision frame conditions,
participants are asked about the regret they would experience from underreporting
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income, only the placement of the question varies, i.e. prior to or after the dependent
measures of interest.5
The control frame proxies for taxpayer decision making in a naturally occurring
environment. That is, since the taxpayers are generally not framed to think of the
potential emotional reactions to the consequences from aggressive tax reporting, the
control frame allows for the best comparison of how a shared interest in the consequences
of tax compliance may alter decision making without additional external influences
(framing).

4.4 DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Participants in the Sole Proprietor (Partnership) condition were informed that “…cash
rental revenue received for the year is between $40,000 and $50,000 ($80,000 and
$100,000)”. Therefore, reporting less than $40,000 ($80,000) of cash revenue in the Sole
Proprietor (Partnership) condition would be considered tax evasion. However, due to the
uncertainty of the actual amount of cash revenue received, participants reporting between
$40,000 and $50,000 ($80,000 and $100,000) in the Sole Proprietor (Partnership)
condition were not necessarily evading taxes, but may be demonstrating different levels
of aggressiveness.
The primary dependent variable for this study captures the participants’
willingness to evade taxes. Specifically, after reading the case material, participants in the
Sole Proprietor (Partnership) condition were asked to indicate on an eleven point scale
“how likely you are to report less than $40,000 ($80,000) of cash rental revenue on the
5

An additional 77 participant observations were collected simultaneously with the data in the four
treatment conditions. These participants were placed into an enjoyment frame. That is, they were asked
how much enjoyment they receive from the tax saving generated by underreporting prior to answering the
dependent measures. These participants were statistically similar to the participant responses in the control
frame.
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current year tax return for the Sole Proprietorship (Partnership)”, with endpoints 1 =
“Very Unlikely” and 11 = “Very Likely”.
After participants indicate their willingness to evade on the scale described above,
participants are next asked to indicate how much of the cash rental revenue they would
report for the year. This monetary figure could range from $0 to $50,000 ($0 to
$100,000) in the Sole Proprietor (Partnership) condition. From this measure, a second
dependent variable is captured as the percent of taxpayers in each treatment condition
who actually evades taxes. That is, the percent of participants who reported less than
$40,000 ($80,000) in the Sole Proprietor (Partnership) condition.
In addition to the primary and secondary dependent measures intended to capture
the participants’ willingness to evade taxes, another measure of interest would be the
relative percent of income not reported in each treatment condition. This measure is
computed as [(possible cash revenue – reported cash revenue) / possible cash revenue],
and will capture the overall aggressiveness of the population in each treatment condition.
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SHARED INTEREST
Sole Proprietor Partnership
Control
Frame

A

B

Regret
Frame

C

D

DECISION
FRAME

FIGURE 4.1 – EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Hypothesis Tests
The above figure reflects the experimental design with the primary dependent variable
measured as the taxpayer’s likelihood of knowingly evading income taxes.
Planned Comparisons
H1a: Sole Proprietor/Control Frame versus Partnership/Control Frame (µB < µA)
H1b: Sole Proprietor/Control Frame versus Partnership/Control Frame (µB > µA)
H2:
Control Frame versus Regret Frame (µA+µB > µC+µD)
H3:
Partnership/Control Frame less Partnership/Regret Frame versus Sole Proprietor
Control Frame less Sole Proprietor//Regret Frame (µB-µD > µA-µC)
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TABLE 4.1 – PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS
147
36.85

Total number of participants
Average participant age:
Gender:

Male
52.7%
Female
47.3%
The region of the United States in which participants currently live:
Midwest
18.3%
Northeast
23.7%
Southeast
27.2%
Southwest
10.7%
West
18.8%
Other
1.3%
Average household income:
< $20,000
12.1%
$20,001 - $50,000
43.3%
$50,001 - $100,000
35.2%
> $101,000
9.4%
Highest level of education completed:
Some high school
0.4%
High school
9.4%
Some college
30.8%
Bachelor's degree
47.3%
Graduate degree or higher
12.1%
Marital status on the most recent federal income tax return:
Single
44.2%
Head of household
9.8%
Married filing jointly
41.6%
Married filing separately
4.0%
Surviving spouse
0.4%
Primary income source:
Wages/salary/commissions
74.1%
Self-employed
18.8%
Investments
1.8%
Other
5.3%
Receive income not directly reported to the IRS on form W-2 or 1099:
1 = Never to 11 = Frequently
3.19
Average number of years the participants have filed federal income tax returns:
17.66
The primary decision maker on the participants income tax returns:
Self
84.4%
Spouse
8.0%
Parent
0.4%
Paid Preparer
6.7%
Other
0.4%
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
5.1 TESTS OF HYPOTHESES
The primary dependent measure captures the participants’ self-reported likelihood of
evading taxes. Recall that in the Sole Proprietor (Partnership) condition, participants read
that they are “confident that the cash rental revenue received for the year is between
$40,000 and $50,000 ($80,000 and $100,000). Therefore, reporting less than $40,000
($80,000) of cash revenue in the Sole Proprietor (Partnership) condition would be
considered tax evasion. To capture the participants likelihood of evading taxes,
participants in the Sole Proprietor (Partnership) condition were specifically asked to
indicate “how likely you are to report less than $40,000 ($80,000) of cash rental revenue
on the current year tax return for the Sole Proprietorship (Partnership) on a scale with
endpoints 1 = “Very Unlikely and 11 = “Very likely”.
Table 5.1 Panel A presents the ANOVA results for between-subjects effects using
the participants’ likelihood of tax evasion scores as the dependent measure. The primary
research question of this study set out to examine how sharing the consequences of tax
evasion with another individual effects tax evasive behavior. Referring to the ANOVA
results presented in Table 2 Panel A, there is a significant main effect on the presence
versus absence of a shared interest (p = 0.010 two-tailed). The descriptive statistics
presented in Table 5.1 Panel B show that the overall likelihood measure of tax evasion
was 4.986 in the Sole Proprietor condition and 3.554 in the Partnership condition.
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Hypotheses 1a and 1b make competing predictions about how a shared interest in
the consequences of tax evasion naturally affects tax evasive behavior. Therefore, the
proper way to test this effect is to examine the simple effect of a shared interest in the
control frame conditions. Hypothesis 1a predicts that, if tax evasion is viewed primarily
as a risky decision, the mean likelihood of evasion will be less in the Partnership
condition than the Sole Proprietor condition. Hypothesis 1b predicts that, if tax evasion is
viewed primarily as an ethical decision, the mean likelihood of evasion will be greater in
the Partnership condition than the Sole Proprietor condition. Presented in Table 5.1 Panel
B, the mean likelihood of tax evasion in the Sole Proprietor/Control Frame condition is
5.757 while in the Partnership/Control Frame condition it is 3.865 and Table 5.1 Panel C
shows that this difference is statistically significant (p = 0.012). Therefore, hypothesis 1a
is supported using the taxpayer’s likelihood of tax evasion as the dependent measure.
The second research question examines if increasing the salience of the potential
regret a taxpayer would experience from an adverse audit affects tax evasive behavior.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that when taxpayers are in the regret frame condition they will
indicate a lower willingness to evade taxes than taxpayers in the control frame condition.
Referring to Table 5.1 Panel A, there is a main effect on decision frame. As noted in
Table 5.1 Panel B, the overall mean likelihood measure of evasion in the control frame
condition is 4.811 while in the regret frame condition it is 3.712 and this difference is
statistically significant (p = .023) which is presented in Table 5.1 Panel A and C.
Therefore, hypothesis 2 is supported using the taxpayer’s likelihood of tax evasion as the
dependent measure.
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Hypothesis 3 predicts that increasing the salience of the potential regret will
decrease taxpayers’ willingness to evade more when they are in the Partnership condition
than the Sole Proprietor condition. As reported in Table 5.1 Panel B, the taxpayers’
likelihood of tax evasion in the Sole Proprietor condition decreased from 5.757 in the
control frame condition to 4.194 in the regret frame condition, for a mean difference of
1.563. In the Partnership condition, the taxpayers’ likelihood of tax evasion decreased
from 3.865 in the control frame condition to 3.243 in the regret frame condition, for a
mean difference of .622. Since the mean decrease in the Sole Proprietor condition was
greater than the mean decrease in the Partnership condition, hypothesis 3 is not supported
using the taxpayer’s likelihood of tax evasion as the dependent measure and the
interaction effect is not significant (p = .386 two tailed).
To test the robustness of the analysis above, this study examines the research
questions and hypotheses using a second measure, the percent of participants who choose
to evade taxes. After participants indicated their likelihood of evading taxes, they were
asked to indicate the amount of cash rental revenue they would report for the business
entity. Specifically, participants in the Sole Proprietor (Partnership) conditions were
asked to indicate “how much of the cash rental revenue, up to $50,000 ($100,000) you
would report on the current year tax return for the Sole Proprietorship (Partnership).”
Recall that in the Sole Proprietor (Partnership) condition, participants read that they are
“confident that the cash rental revenue received for the year is between $40,000 and
$50,000 ($80,000 and $100,000). Therefore, reporting less than $40,000 ($80,000) of
cash revenue in the Sole Proprietor (Partnership) condition would be considered tax
evasion. Participants’ responses are coded dichotomously as a 1 if the participants
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reported less than $40,000 ($80,000) in the Sole Proprietor (Partnership) condition and 0
otherwise.
Table 5.2 Panel A presents the Categorical ANOVA results examining the percent
of participants who actually evade taxes. Consistent with the primary analysis presented
above, the Categorical ANOVA results presented in Table 5.2 Panel A, demonstrate a
significant main effect on the presence versus absence of a shared interest (p = 0.031 twotailed). Referring to the descriptive statistics presented in Table 5.2 Panel B, the percent
of participants who evaded taxes in the Sole Proprietor condition was 42.5% and in the
Partnership condition it was 28.4%.
Hypothesis 1a predicts that if tax evasion is viewed primarily as a risky decision,
the willingness of taxpayers to evade taxes will be less in the Partnership condition than
the Sole Proprietor condition. Presented in Table 5.2 Panel B, the percent of taxpayers
evading taxes in the Sole Proprietor/Control Frame condition is 54.1% while in the
Partnership/Control Frame condition it is 29.7% and Table 5.2 Panel C shows that this
difference is statistically significant (p = 0.014). Therefore, hypothesis 1a is supported
using both the taxpayers’ self-reported likelihood of tax evasion as the dependent
measure, and the actual percent of taxpayers evading taxes as the dependent measure.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the percent of taxpayers who evade taxes will be lower
in the regret frame condition than in the control frame condition. Table 5.2 Panel A,
reports a marginally significant main effect on decision frame. Table 5.2 Panel B displays
that the overall percent of taxpayers evading taxes in the control frame condition is
41.9% while in the regret frame condition it is 31.5% and this difference is marginally
statistically significant (p = .092) which is presented in Table 5.2 Panel A and C.

25

Therefore, hypothesis 2 is marginally supported using the percent of taxpayers who evade
taxes as the dependent measure.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that increasing the salience of the potential regret will
decrease the percent of taxpayers evading taxes more when they are in the Partnership
condition than the Sole Proprietor condition. Table 5.2 Panel B shows that in the Sole
Proprietor condition the percent of taxpayers evading taxes decreased from 54.1% in the
control frame condition to 36.1% in the regret frame condition, for a difference of 18%.
In the Partnership condition the percent of taxpayers evading taxes decreased from 29.7%
in the control frame condition to 27.0% in the regret frame condition, for a difference of
2.7%. Since the decrease in the Sole Proprietor condition was greater than the decrease in
the Partnership condition, hypothesis 3 is not supported using the percent of taxpayers
evading taxes as the dependent measure and the interaction is not significant (p = .326
two tailed). Consistent primary dependent measure, it appears that regret salience has a
much greater impact on taxpayers in the Sole Proprietorship condition than the
Partnership condition.

5.2 ANCILLARY ANALYSIS
Another way to examine the research questions in this study is to examine the overall
aggressiveness level of the treatment conditions by comparing the percent of cash
revenue not reported. This variable is computed as [(possible cash revenue – reported
cash revenue) / possible cash revenue].6 Recall that, participants in the Sole Proprietor
(Partnership) conditions were asked to indicate “how much of the cash rental revenue, up

6

In the Partnership condition this variable is computed as [($100,000 – reported cash revenue) / $100,000]
while in the Sole Proprietor condition this variable is computed as [($50,000 – reported cash revenue) /
$50,000]
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to $50,000 ($100,000) you would report on the current year tax return for the Sole
Proprietorship (Partnership).
Table 5.3 Panel A presents the ANOVA results for between-subjects effects using
the percent of possible cash rental revenue not reported as the dependent measure.
Referring to the ANOVA results presented in Table 5.3 Panel A, there is a significant
main effect on the presence versus absence of a shared interest (p = 0.019 two-tailed).
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 5.3 Panel B display the percent of possible
cash rental revenue not reported in the Sole Proprietor condition was 33.5% and in the
Partnership condition it was 23.3%.
Presented in Table 5.3 Panel B, the mean percent of possible cash revenue not
reported in the Sole Proprietor/Control Frame condition is 37.5% while in the
Partnership/Control Frame condition it is 23.8% and Table 5.3 Panel C shows that this
difference is statistically significant (p = 0.010). Therefore, the results using the percent
of possible cash rental revenue not reported as the dependent measure are similar to the
results from the primary analysis and demonstrate that taxpayers’ aggressiveness
decreases when there is a shared interest in the consequences of tax evasion.
Presented in Table 5.3 Panel B, mean percent of possible cash rental revenue not
reported in the control frame condition is 30.6% while in the regret frame condition it is
26.0% and Table 5.3 Panel C shows that this difference is not statistically significant (p =
.142). Therefore, it does not appear that participants overall aggressiveness was
significantly affected by increasing the salience of regret. In addition increasing the
salience of regret did not affect participants in the Partnership condition more than
participants in the Sole Proprietorship condition (p = .401 two tailed).
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5.3 DISCUSSION
The first set of hypotheses examined whether sharing the consequences of tax evasion
with another individual affected tax evasive behavior. The prior literature suggests that if
the tax evasion decision is thought to be viewed as primarily a risky decision, a shared
interest will decrease tax evasion. However, if the tax evasion decision is thought to be
viewed as primarily an ethical decision, a shared interest will increase the unethical
behavior. Both dependent measures support the risky decision making literature and
demonstrate that a taxpayer’s willingness to evade decreases when there is a shared
interest in the consequences of tax evasion.
To better understand the participants’ rationale for their reporting decision,
participants were asked to describe up to three factors they considered when deciding
how much of the cash rental revenue they were going to report. Two independent coders
categorized these qualitative responses into three categories. The first category “risky
decision” was utilized if participants indicated that audit probabilities or penalties were
considered when making the tax reporting decision. The second category “ethical
decision” was utilized if participants’ ethical beliefs, honesty, or ‘the right thing to do’
were the rationale when making the tax reporting decision. The final category “other”
encompassed any rationale that did not fit into the other two categories. Of the total
responses, 25.9% fell into the “risky decision” category and 21.8% fell into the “ethical
decision” category.7 These responses support that a tax evasion decision is a combination

7

Participants were asked to indicate up to three factors they considered when deciding the amount of cash
rental revenues to report. A majority of the participants indicated an ethical consideration as one factor, risk
as another factor and a third factor that did not fit into either an ethics based category or a risk based
category. Some of the examples of the uncategorized factors were economic satiation, government distrust,
or fairness of the tax code.
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of a risky decision and an ethical decision, but it is not clear from the qualitative
responses if one outweighs the other.
To understand if taxpayers ethical beliefs towards tax evasion was dependent
upon the presence or absence of a shared interest in the consequences of tax evasion,
participants were asked to indicate how unethical they personally feel it would be to
evade taxes in this case on a scale where 1 = “Not Unethical” and 11 = “Very Unethical”.
Table 5.4 reports that participants in the Partnership condition felt that tax evasion was
more unethical than participants in the Sole Proprietor condition, 8.72 versus 7.86
respectively (p = .035 two-tailed). Consistent with Wiltermuth (2011), this study
demonstrates that a shared interest the consequences of an unethical behavior affect an
individual’s ethicality judgments towards that behavior. Interestingly though, contrary to
Wiltermuth (2011), this study demonstrates that a shared interest in a tax evasion decision
increases participants perceptions of the unethicality of tax evasion. One possibility is
that participants felt that it was more unethical to evade taxes in the shared interest
condition because of the element of risk.
Self-reported measures were used to capture the participants’ perception of the
emotional costs and benefits towards underreporting rental revenue. Specifically, the first
question captures the participants’ perceptions of the emotional benefits of
underreporting by asking them to indicate “how HAPPY you would feel from the
positive consequences that may result from underreporting rental revenue”. The second
question captures the participants’ perceptions of the emotional costs of underreporting
by asking them to indicate “how SAD you would feel from the negative consequences
that may result from underreporting rental revenue”. Responses to these two questions
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were netted together to form a single measure, “emotional cost/benefit” analysis. If the
emotional cost/benefit score was above zero then the participants felt the benefits of
underreporting outweighed the costs, while if this cost/benefit score was below zero then
the participants felt the cost of underreporting outweighed the benefits.
Table 5.4 reports in the Partnership condition the participants perceived emotional
cost/benefit score was -2.95 which is significantly different from the participants in the
Sole Proprietor condition which was -0.99 (p = .008 two-tailed). Therefore, it appears
that when participants share the consequences of tax evasion with another individual,
they perceive the emotional costs to outweigh the benefits by a greater amount than
participants who do not share the consequences of tax evasion.
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FIGURE 5.1 – LIKELIHOOD OF EVASION
The participants’ likelihood of tax evasion scores are based on the mean participants’
response to the question, “Please indicate below, how likely you are to report less than
$40,000 ($80,000) of cash rental revenue on the current year tax return for the Sole
Proprietorship (Partnership). The participants’ responses were measured on an elevenpoint scale with endpoints labeled 1 = “Very Unlikely and 11 = “Very likely”.
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FIGURE 5.2 – PERCENT OF PARTICIPANTS EVADING
Participants in this study were asked to indicate “how much of the cash rental revenue, up
to $50,000 ($100,000) you would report on the current year tax return for the Sole
Proprietorship (Partnership).” In the Sole Proprietor (Partnership) condition, participants
read that they are “confident that the cash rental revenue received for the year is between
$40,000 and $50,000 ($80,000 and $100,000). Therefore, reporting less than $40,000
($80,000) of cash revenue in the Sole Proprietor (Partnership) condition would be
considered tax evasion. Participants’ responses are coded dichotomously as a 1 if the
participants reported less than $40,000 ($80,000) in the Sole Proprietor (Partnership)
condition and 0 otherwise.
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FIGURE 5.3 – PERCENT OF POSSIBLE CASH REVENUE NOT REPORTED
The percent of possible cash revenue not reported is computed as [(possible cash revenue
– reported cash revenue) / possible cash revenue]. Participants in the Sole Proprietor
(Partnership) conditions were asked to indicate “how much of the cash rental revenue, up
to $50,000 ($100,000) you would report on the current year tax return for the Sole
Proprietorship (Partnership). Therefore, in the Partnership condition this variable is
computed as [($100,000 – reported cash revenue) / $100,000] while in the Sole Proprietor
condition this variable is computed as [($50,000 – reported cash revenue) / $50,000].
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TABLE 5.1 ANOVA RESULTS AND PLANNED CONTRASTS
Dependent Variable: Participants Likelihood of Evasion
1= "Very Unlikely" 11= "Very Likely"
Panel A: ANOVA for Between-Subjects Effects
Source
Sum of Squares
Shared Interest
74.254
Decision Frame
43.814
Shared Interest*Decision Frame
8.129
Error
1539.585

df
1
1
1
143

Mean Square
74.254
43.814
8.129
10.766

F
6.897
4.070
0.755

P (two-tailed)
0.010
0.046
0.386

Panel B: Descriptive Statistics: Mean [Standard Deviation]
SHARED INTEREST
Sole Proprietor Partnership
Control
Frame

5.757
[3.914]

3.865
[2.887]

4.811
[3.567]

Regret
Frame

4.194
[3.487]

3.243
[2.476]

3.712
[3.054]

4.986
[3.791]

3.554
[2.707]

4.265
[3.367]

DECISION
FRAME

Panel C: Planned Contrasts
Means Compared
4.986 > 3.554

Main Effect - Sole Proprietor vs. Partnership

t-Value
3.623

P (one-tailed)
0.005

Simple Effect - Sole Proprietor/Control vs. Partnership/Control

5.757 > 3.865

3.334

0.012

Simple Effect - Sole Proprietor/Regret vs. Partnership/Regret

4.194 > 3.243

1.322

0.096

4.811 > 3.712

2.015

0.023

Main Effect - Control Frame vs. Regret Frame
Simple Effect - Sole Proprietor/Control vs. Sole Proprietor/Regret

5.757 > 4.194

1.777

0.040

Simple Effect - Partnership/Control vs. Partnership/Regret

3.865 > 3.243

0.981

0.165

Interaction - Partnership/Control less Partnership/Regret vs.
Sole Proprietor/Control less Sole Proprietor/Regret
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0.621 > 1.563

n.s.

TABLE 5.2 CATEGORICAL ANOVA RESULTS AND PLANNED CONTRASTS
Dependent Variable: Percent of Participants 'Knowingly Evading'
Panel A: Categorical ANOVA for Between-Subjects Effects
Source
Shared Interest
Decision Frame
Shared Interest*Decision Frame

df
1
1
1

Chi-Square P (two-tailed)
4.630
0.031
1.770
0.184
0.960
0.326

Panel B: Descriptive Statistics

Panel C: Planned Contrasts
Means Compared Chi Square P (one-tailed)
42.5% > 28.4%
4.630
0.016

Main Effect - Sole Proprietor vs. Partnership
Simple Effect - Sole Proprietor/Control vs. Partnership/Control

54.1% > 29.7%

4.790

0.014

Simple Effect - Sole Proprietor/Regret vs. Partnership/Regret

36.1% > 27.0%

0.700

0.201

41.9% > 31.5%

1.770

0.092

Simple Effect - Sole Proprietor/Control vs. Sole Proprietor/Regret

54.1% > 36.1%

2.450

0.059

Simple Effect - Partnership/Control vs. Partnership/Regret

29.7% > 27.0%

0.070

0.398

Main Effect - Control Frame vs. Regret Frame

Interaction - Partnership/Control less Partnership/Regret vs.
Sole Proprietor/Control less Sole Proprietor/Regret
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02.7% > 18.0%

n.s.

TABLE 5.3 - ANOVA RESULTS AND PLANNED CONTRASTS
Dependent Variable: Percent of Possible Cash Revenue Not Reported
Panel A: ANOVA for Between-Subjects Effects
Source
Sum of Squares
Shared Interest
0.378
Decision Frame
0.077
Shared Interest*Decision Frame
0.047
Error
9.542

df
1
1
1
143

Mean Square
0.378
0.077
0.047
0.067

F
5.662
1.160
0.710

P (two-tailed)
0.019
0.283
0.401

Panel B: Descriptive Statistics: Mean [Standard Deviation]
SHARED INTEREST
Sole Proprietor Partnership
Control
Frame

37.5%
[26.9%]

23.8%
[21.3%]

30.6%
[25.2%]

Regret
Frame

29.3%
[25.4%]

22.8%
[27.8%]

26.0%
[26.9%]

33.5%
[26.5%]

23.3%
[24.8%]

28.3%
[26.1%]

DECISION
FRAME

Panel C: Planned Contrasts
Means Compared
33.5% > 23.3%

t-Value
2.380

P (one-tailed)
0.010

Simple Effect - Sole Proprietor/Control vs. Partnership/Control

37.5% > 23.8%

2.401

0.010

Simple Effect - Sole Proprietor/Regret vs. Partnership/Regret

29.3% > 22.8%

1.036

0.152

30.6% > 26.0%

1.077

0.142

37.5% > 29.3%

1.318

0.096

23.8% > 22.8%

0.171

0.433

Main Effect - Sole Proprietor vs. Partnership

Main Effect - Control Frame vs. Regret Frame
Simple Effect - Sole Proprietor/Control vs. Sole Proprietor/Regret
Simple Effect - Partnership/Control vs. Partnership/Regret
Interaction - Partnership/Control less Partnership/Regret vs.
Sole Proprietor/Control less Sole Proprietor/Regret
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01.0% > 08.2%

n.s.

TABLE 5.4 - PARTICIPANT RESPONSESA
Sole Proprietor Partnership p (two-tailed)
73
74

Number of participants
Dependent measures
Liklihood of tax evasion
Percent of participant evading taxes
Percent of income not reported

4.99
45.2%
33.5%

3.55
28.4%
23.3%

0.010
0.035
0.018

Supplemental measures
Anticipated regret from tax evasion

8.45

8.69

0.649

How unethical is it to "evade taxes"
How unethical is it to "be aggressive"

7.86
3.70

8.72
4.28

0.064
0.249

Perceived cost/benefit analysis
Perceived guilt from under-reporting

-0.99
7.22

-2.95
8.45

0.008
0.026

Perceived audit probability
Perceived penalty rate

35.4%
61.2%

34.7%
51.7%

0.870
0.071

a

Participants’ responded to the dependent measures and multiple supplemental measures. To compare
participants’ responses between the shared interest condition and the condition in which there was not a
shared interest, this table collapses both “decision frame conditions” so that contrasts between the Sole
Proprietor condition and the Partnership condition can be made.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Factors that affect tax compliance are of great importance to multiple parties, including
the IRS, tax professionals, and taxpayers. As such, it is important for researchers to
continue to gain a better understanding of how these factors affect tax compliance. Early
tax literature focused on how economic factors (i.e. income level and tax rates) and
deterrent factors (i.e. audit probability and penalty rates) alter tax compliance behavior.
However, the inability of these early models to accurately predict tax compliance has led
researchers to focus on additional influences, such as ethical beliefs. The current study
provides insight into whether a shared interest in the consequences of tax compliance can
affect taxpayer behavior.
The results of this study demonstrate that taxpayers are less willing to evade
income when there is a shared interest in the consequences of tax evasion. This finding
has significant implications both regulators and researchers. Regulators should be
interested in this study as it sheds light on how they may direct audits in a more effective
and efficient manner. For example, current audits may tend to focus on Partnership
entities because there is more revenue or assets owned by these companies, but this
study’s results suggest that these entities will be less likely to misreport taxable income.
Researchers can expand on this study by investigating why a shared interest in the
consequences of tax evasion alters behavior. One example might be that Sole Proprietors
more likely to evade because they believe no one will find out, whereas in a Partnership
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other individuals might become aware of the behavior. Another possible explanation is
that individuals may feel more entitled to additional tax savings when they are the only
individuals who put forth effort in a business venture. Additionally researchers should
note that although the early economic models of tax evasion may not accurately predict
tax evasive behavior, taxpayers still seem to be heavily influenced by the risk involved in
tax evasion decisions.
This study also investigates whether making taxpayers aware of the regret they
would experience if they are caught evading taxes will lead to lower levels of tax evasion.
Results support the predictions by demonstrating that heightening a taxpayer’s awareness
of potential regret results in taxpayers being less likely to evade. In this study,
participants were asked directly about emotions of regret. Future research can explore
how the IRS could use these results to develop marketing strategies to make regret more
salient to taxpayers before making tax compliance decisions. This is consistent with Alm
and Torgler (2011), which suggested that “publicizing tax evasion convictions in the
media as an alternative, non-financial type of penalty, and using mass media to reinforce
tax compliance as the ethical norm of behavior – and publicize cheaters” may increase
tax compliance.
Experimental design choices of this study may create limitations on the
generalizability of the results, which may provide avenues for future research. First,
participants in the Partnership condition are unaware of their partner’s preferences for tax
compliance. Research on group risk shift would suggest that the presence of an
aggressive partner would influence the decision maker to become more aggressive, and a
conservative partner would influence the decision maker to make a more conservative
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decision. Additionally, Church et al. (2012) provided evidence that a beneficiary to an
unethical act who prefers honest reporting may eliminate a decision maker’s ability to
morally disengage the decision. Another limitation of this study is that decision makers in
the Partnership setting only had one partner, while many entities have more than two
owners. Future research can explore whether the results of this study generalize to these
various partner interactions.
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APPENDIX A – INSTRUMENT MATERIALS
Participant Qualifying Questions (Common to All Participants)
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Introduction (Common to All Participants)

45

Partnership/Control Frame Condition (Case Materials)
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Partnership/Control Frame Condition (Dependent Measures)
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Partnership/Control Frame Condition (Supplemental Measures)

Note that in the Regret Frame Condition, the last item on this page was asked prior to the
dependent measures.
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Sole Proprietor/Control Frame Condition (Case Materials)

49

Sole Proprietor/Control Frame Condition (Dependent Measures)
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Sole Proprietor/Control Frame Condition (Supplemental Measures)

Note that in the Regret Frame Condition, the last item on this page was asked prior to the
dependent measures.
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